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ABSTRACT	  
	   	   Authentication	  is	  of	  paramount	  importance	  for	  all	  modern	  networked	  applications.	  The	  
username/password	   paradigm	   is	   ubiquitous.	   This	   paradigm	   suffices	   for	  many	   applications	   that	  
require	  a	  relatively	  low	  level	  of	  assurance	  about	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  end	  user,	  but	  it	  quickly	  breaks	  
down	  when	  a	  stronger	  assertion	  of	  the	  user’s	  identity	  is	  required.	  Traditionally,	  this	  is	  where	  two-­‐	  
or	  multi-­‐factor	  authentication	  comes	  in,	  providing	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  assurance.	  There	  is	  a	  multitude	  
of	  two-­‐factor	  authentication	  solutions	  available,	  but	  we	  feel	  that	  many	  solutions	  do	  not	  meet	  the	  
needs	  of	  our	  community.	  They	  are	  invariably	  expensive,	  difficult	  to	  roll	  out	  in	  heterogeneous	  user	  
groups	   (like	   student	  populations),	  often	   closed	   source	  and	   closed	   technology	  and	  have	  usability	  
problems	  that	  make	  them	  hard	  to	  use.	  In	  this	  paper	  we	  will	  give	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  two-­‐factor	  au-­‐
thentication	  landscape	  and	  address	  the	  issues	  of	  closed	  versus	  open	  solutions.	  We	  will	  introduce	  a	  
novel	   open	   standards-­‐based	   authentication	   technology	   that	  we	   have	   developed	   and	   released	   in	  
open	  source.	  We	  will	   then	  provide	  a	  classification	  of	   two-­‐factor	  authentication	  technologies,	  and	  




Authentication	   is	   something	   we	   all	   do	   every	  
day.	   And	   whether	   it	   is	   to	   log	   in	   to	   our	   e-­‐mail	   ac-­‐
count,	   to	   access	   our	   Facebook	   page	   or	   to	   tweet	  
about	   that	   cool	   new	   album	   we’ve	   just	   bought,	   the	  
use	   of	   username/password	   is	   by	   far	   the	   dominant	  
paradigm.	  
There	   are	   –	   of	   course	   –	   applications	   that	   re-­‐
quire	  a	  higher	   level	  of	  assurance	  such	  as	  electronic	  
banking.	  The	  traditional	  approach	  for	  achieving	  this	  
higher	   level	   of	   assurance	   is	   to	   use	  multi-­‐factor	   au-­‐
thentication	   (also	   referred	   to	   as	   strong	  authentica-­‐
tion).	  There	   is	   a	  multitude	  of	  multi-­‐factor	  authenti-­‐
cation	   solutions	   on	   the	   market.	   Traditionally,	   this	  
market	  has	  a	  strong	   tendency	   towards	  closed	  solu-­‐
tions	   with	   strong	   vendor	   lock-­‐in.	   This	   invariably	  
leads	   to	   a	   high	   cost	   per	   user,	   hampering	   the	  wide-­‐
scale	   rollout	  of	  multi-­‐factor	  authentication	   technol-­‐
ogies.	  Another	  common	   limitation	  of	  current	  multi-­‐
factor	   authentication	   technologies	   is	   the	   fact	   that	  
they	   are	   often	   single-­‐purpose	   solutions	   (e.g.	   they	  
can	  only	  be	  used	  for	  one	  bank).	  Furthermore,	  there	  
are	   serious	   usability	   issues	  with	  many	  multi-­‐factor	  
solutions	  that	  make	  it	  difficult	  to	  enforce	  their	  use	  in	  
most	  communities.	  
Exactly	  what	   an	  acceptable	   level	  of	   assurance	  
is	  should	  not	  only	  be	  decided	  by	  a	  service	  provider;	  
users	  may	   also	   have	   an	   opinion	   on	   this.	  Almost	   all	  
solutions	   currently	   on	   the	   market	   give	   very	   little	  
control	  to	  the	  end	  user.	  
1.2 RECENT	  INDUSTRY	  DEVELOPMENTS	  
In	  recent	  years	  there	  have	  been	  some	  promis-­‐
ing	  developments	  in	  the	  industry.	  In	  2004,	  the	  Initi-­‐
ative	   for	   Open	   Authentication	   (OATH,	   [1])	   was	  
formed.	   The	   intention	   of	   this	   initiative	   is	   to	   create	  
an	   industry-­‐wide	   reference	   architecture	   for	   strong	  
authentication.	   The	   OATH	   initiative	   has	   been	   very	  
successful	   in	   creating	   industry	   standards	   for	   two-­‐
factor	   authentication	   that	   have	   been	   embraced	   by	  
the	   Internet	   community	   in	   the	   form	  of	   IETF	   stand-­‐
ards	  ([2],	  [3],	  [4]).	  A	  number	  of	  companies	  and	  open	  
source	   initiatives	   have	   adopted	   these	   standards	   in	  
products	  and	  services	  (see	  also	  section	  3).	  
Other	  developments	  have	  underlined	  the	  need	  
to	  adopt	  open	  standards	  in	  the	  security	  and	  authen-­‐
tication/identity	   management	   industry.	   Time	   and	  
again	   closed	   solutions	   and	   algorithms	   have	   been	  
shown	  to	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  attack	  because	  of	  the	  lack	  
of	   peer	   review	   (poignant	   examples	   include	   the	  
MIFARE	   system	   and	   the	   GSM	   A5/1	   cryptographic	  
algorithm	  [5]).	  
Finally,	   large	  players	  on	   the	   Internet	  have	   re-­‐
cently	   introduced	   two-­‐factor	   authentication	   for	  
some	  of	  their	  services	  ([6],	  [7]).	  This	  is	  the	  first	  time	  
two-­‐factor	   authentication	   is	   deployed	   on	   a	   (poten-­‐
tially)	  large	  scale	  for	  applications	  outside	  the	  finan-­‐
cial	  industry	  or	  enterprise	  domain.	  
1.3 OVERVIEW	  OF	  THIS	  PAPER	  
In	  this	  paper	  we	  aim	  to	  give	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  
current	   two-­‐factor	  authentication	   landscape	   in	   sec-­‐
tion	  2.	   In	   section	  3,	  we	  will	   further	   clarify	   some	  of	  
the	   issues	   we	   believe	   exist	   in	   current	   two-­‐factor	  
authentication	  market	  offerings.	  Section	  4	  proposes	  
a	  way	   to	   classify	   authentication	   solutions	   and	   con-­‐
tains	   a	   classification	   of	   the	   solutions	   discussed	   in	  
section	  2.	  In	  section	  5,	  we	  will	  introduce	  the	  innova-­‐
tive	   two-­‐factor	   authentication	   solution	   we	   have	  
developed	   which	   is	   based	   on	   open	   standards	   and	  
open	  technology.	  Section	  6	  revisits	  the	  classification	  
proposed	   in	   section	   4	   and	   adds	   a	   classification	   for	  
the	   solution	  we	   introduced	   in	   section	   5.	   Finally,	   in	  
section	   7	   we	   will	   draw	   conclusions	   and	   provide	  
suggestions	  for	  future	  work.	  
2 THE	  TWO-­‐FACTOR	  LANDSCAPE	  
2.1 INTRODUCTION	  
In	   this	   section	  we	   aim	   to	   give	   an	  overview	  of	  
the	  two-­‐factor	  landscape.	  Before	  we	  do	  that,	  we	  will	  
first	   give	   a	   definition	   of	  what	  we	   think	   constitutes	  
two-­‐factor	  authentication.	  	  
We	   then	   describe	   the	   solutions	   currently	   on	  
offer,	  which	  we	  divide	  into	  two	  categories:	  
 Traditional	   solutions	   –	   these	   rely	   on	   single	  
purpose	   (i.e.	   only	   used	   for	   identification)	  
hardware	  devices	  or	  on	  a	  unique	  quality	  of	  the	  
user	  (i.e.	  a	  biometric)	  
 Hybrid	   solutions	   –	   these	   rely	   on	   non-­‐single	  
purpose	   devices	   owned	   by	   the	   user,	   possibly	  
in	  combination	  with	  software	  running	  on	  the-­‐
se	  devices	  
2.2 DEFINITION	   OF	   TWO-­‐FACTOR	   AU-­‐
THENTICATION	  
In	  this	  paper,	  we	  define	  two-­‐factor	  authentica-­‐
tion	  as	  a	  means	  of	  authentication	  relying	  on	  the	  user	  
demonstrating	   at	   least	   2	   separate	   factors	   from	   the	  
following	  list:	  
 Something	  the	  user	  knows	  (e.g.	  a	  PIN	  code	  or	  a	  
password)	  
 Something	   the	   user	   has	   (e.g.	   a	   hardware	   to-­‐
ken)	  
 Something	  the	  user	  is	  (e.g.	  a	  biometric,	  such	  as	  
a	  fingerprint)	  
Solutions	  that	  we	  place	  in	  the	  “hybrid”	  category	  rely	  
on	   something	   the	   user	   has	   but	   where	   there	   is	   a	  
chance	  of	  this	  factor	  being	  duplicated	  as	  could	  –	  for	  
instance	  –	  be	   the	  case	  with	  a	  soft	   token	  running	  as	  
an	  application	  on	  a	  smartphone.	  Some	  people	  in	  the	  
blogosphere	   have	   coined	   the	   term	   “1.5	   factor	   au-­‐
thentication”	  for	  this	  category	  (e.g.	  [40])	  
In	   this	   paper	   we	   will	   refer	   to	   a	   solution	   as	   two-­‐
factor	  authentication	  whenever	  the	  device	  on	  which	  
the	   user	   is	   authenticating	   is	   physically	   separate	  
from	  whatever	   constitutes	   the	   second	   factor	   (e.g.	   a	  
soft	  token	  on	  a	  phone	  is	  only	  a	  second	  factor	  if	   it	   is	  
used	   for	  authenticating	  a	   session	  on	  a	   separate	  de-­‐
vice	  such	  as	  the	  user’s	  computer).	  
2.3 TRADITIONAL	  SOLUTIONS	  
2.3.1 OTP	  TOKENS	  
One-­‐Time	  Password	  or	  OTP	  tokens	  are	  devices	  
that	   generate	   single-­‐use	   passwords	   (often	   com-­‐
posed	   of	   strings	   of	   up	   to	   10	   digits).	   There	   are	   two	  
variants:	  time-­‐based	  tokens	  –	  these	  generate	  a	  new	  
password	   at	   regular	   intervals	   (e.g.	   every	   30	   se-­‐
conds)	   and	   event-­‐based	   tokens	   –	   these	   generate	   a	  
new	  password	   after	   a	   user	   intervention	   (e.g.	   push-­‐
ing	  a	  button	  on	  the	  device).	  
The	   second	   factor	   most	   often	   combined	   with	  
these	  devices	  is	  either	  a	  password	  that	  is	  entered	  on	  
the	  user’s	  computer	  or	  a	  PIN	  that	   is	  entered	  on	  the	  
token	  device	  itself.	  
OTP	   tokens	   rely	   on	   symmetric	   cryptography	  
for	  their	  operation;	  they	  contain	  some	  secret	  that	  is	  
securely	  stored	  in	  the	  device,	  which	  can	  never	  leave	  
it.	  The	  same	  secret	  is	  also	  known	  on	  the	  server	  that	  
validates	  the	  user’s	  credentials	  when	  they	  log	  in.	  
Examples	   of	   OTP	   tokens	   include:	   VASCO	  
Digipass	   [10],	   RSA	   SecurID	   [11]	   and	   Feitian	   OTP	  
Tokens	  [12].	  
	  
Figure	  1	  -­‐	  example	  of	  an	  OTP	  token	  (RSA	  SecurID)	  
2.3.2 CHALLENGE/RESPONSE	  TOKENS	  
Challenge/response	  tokens	  are	  similar	  to	  OTP	  
tokens	  in	  that	  they	  also	  rely	  on	  symmetric	  cryptog-­‐
raphy	   for	   their	   operation.	   Some	   OTP	   tokens	   also	  
have	  challenge/response	  capabilities.	  
Whereas	  OTP	  often	  suffices	  for	  simple	  authen-­‐
tication,	  challenge/response	  tokens	  are	  mainly	  used	  
for	   transaction	  authentication	  such	  as,	   for	   instance,	  
approving	   a	   money	   transfer.	   This	   is	   achieved	   by	  
having	   the	   user	   enter	   one	   or	   more	   sequences	   of	  
digits	  on	   the	   token	   (the	   challenge)	   and	  using	   these	  
as	   input	   for	   a	   cryptographic	   algorithm	   to	   produce	  
another	   sequence	   of	   digits	   (the	   response)	   that	   the	  
user	   then	  returns	   to	   the	  party	   requesting	  authenti-­‐
cation.	  
Challenge/response	   tokens	   are	   usually	   pro-­‐
tected	  using	  a	  PIN	  code	  as	  the	  second	  factor.	  
Examples	   of	   challenge/response	   tokens	   in-­‐
clude	  VASCO	  DigiPass	  [13],	  SafeNet	  SafeWord	  GOLD	  
[14]	  and	  Feitian	  Challenge/Response	  tokens	  [12].	  
	  Figure	  2	  -­‐	  example	  of	  a	  challenge/response	  token	  
(SafeWord	  GOLD)	  
2.3.3 PKI	  TOKENS	  
In	  contrast	   to	   the	  previous	   two	  solutions,	  PKI	  
tokens	  rely	  on	  public	  key	  cryptography.	  
Under	  the	  hood,	  almost	  all	  PKI	   tokens	  rely	  on	  
smart	   card	   ICs	   with	   a	   cryptographic	   co-­‐processor	  
capable	   of	   performing	   public	   key	   operations	   and	   –	  
in	  most	  cases	  –	  key	  generation.	  They	  come	  in	  a	  vari-­‐
ety	  of	  form	  factors,	  the	  two	  most	  common	  being	  the	  
smart	  card	  and	  the	  USB	  dongle.	  
Authentication	  with	   PKI	   tokens	   usually	   relies	  
on	  some	  form	  of	  challenge/response	  algorithm.	  The	  
aim	  of	  these	  algorithms	  is	  to	  prove	  that	  the	  user	  is	  in	  
possession	  of	   the	  private	  key	  belonging	   to	   a	  public	  
key	  that	  is	  usually	  stored	  in	  an	  X.509	  certificate	  (for	  
more	  details,	  see	  [5]	  sections	  3.2	  and	  4).	  
Contrary	   to	   the	   previous	   two	   solutions,	   PKI	  
tokens	   usually	   interface	  with	   the	   end	   user	   system.	  
They	   rely	   on	   software	   running	   on	   that	   system	   to	  
integrate	   with,	   for	   example,	   the	   browser	   and	   mail	  
client.	  There	  is	  an	  exception	  to	  this	  rule:	  Mobile	  PKI	  
(see	  [8]).	   In	  Mobile	  PKI,	  the	  user’s	  SIM	  card	  is	  used	  
as	   a	   PKI	   token;	   interfacing	   with	   the	   token	   takes	  
place	  using	  special	  SMS	  text	  messages.	  
PKI	   tokens	   have	   a	   broader	   applicability	   than	  
just	  authentication.	  They	  can	  also	  be	  used	  to	  create	  
advanced	  –	  and	  in	  some	  jurisdictions	  legally	  binding	  
–	   digital	   signatures	   (for	   more	   information,	   see	   [5]	  
section	  4.9).	  
2.4 HYBRID	  SOLUTIONS	  
2.4.1 SMS	  OTP	  
For	  many	  years	  now,	  the	  fact	  that	  almost	  eve-­‐
ryone	  has	  a	  mobile	  phone	  is	  being	  used	  as	  a	  means	  
for	   two-­‐factor	   authentication.	   Many	   users	   will	   be	  
familiar	  with	  SMS	  One-­‐Time	  Passwords.	  
SMS	   OTP	   relies	   on	   an	   authentication	   server	  
sending	  one-­‐time	  passwords	  by	  SMS	  text	  message	  to	  
the	  user.	  The	  user’s	  mobile	  phone	  is	  thus	  leveraged	  
as	   an	   authentication	   factor.	   The	   other	   factor	   is	  
commonly	  username/password	   (thus	   the	  user	   first	  
logs	   in	   using	   username/password	   and	   then	   pro-­‐
vides	   additional	   proof	   of	   his	   or	   her	   identity	   using	  
SMS	  OTP).	  
There	   is	   some	   discussion	   about	  whether	   SMS	  
OTP	   constitutes	   real	   two-­‐factor	   authentication	  
([15],	  [16]).	  Especially	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  pro-­‐
tect	   the	   user	   against	   (temporary)	   stealing	   of	   their	  
phone	  is	  a	  concern	  (putting	  a	  PIN	  lock	  almost	  never	  
provides	  protection	  since	  SMS’s	  are	  displayed	  even	  
if	  the	  handset	  is	  locked).	  
There	  are	  many	  vendors	  of	  SMS	  OTP	  services;	  
a	  Google	   search	   for	   “SMS	  OTP”	  will	   produce	  a	   long	  
list.	  
2.4.2 OTP	  APPS	  
Another	   more	   recent	   development	   is	   the	   ap-­‐
pearance	  of	  One-­‐Time	  Password	  Apps.	  These	  run	  on	  
modern	  handsets	  (smart	  phones)	  and	  usually	  mimic	  
the	  behaviour	  of	  OTP	  tokens	  (see	  section	  2.3.1).	  The	  
difference	  between	  these	  Apps	  and	  ‘real’	  OTP	  tokens	  
is	  that	  the	  secret	  is	  stored	  and	  processed	  in	  software	  
on	   the	   handset.	   This	   makes	   them	   somewhat	   more	  
vulnerable	  to	  attacks.	  
Most	   OTP	   token	   vendors	   now	   also	   have	   App	  
versions	  of	  their	  OTP	  tokens	  that	  interface	  with	  the	  
same	  backend	  server	  systems	  that	  are	  also	  used	  for	  
their	  hardware	  tokens.	  
3 ISSUES	  IN	  TWO-­‐FACTOR	  AUTHEN-­‐
TICATION	  
3.1 INTRODUCTION	  
We	  feel	  that	  there	  are	  several	  issues	  surround-­‐
ing	   two-­‐factor	   authentication	   that	   are	   hampering	  
rollout	  on	  a	   larger	  scale;	  most	  solutions	  are	  closed,	  
they	  often	  use	  single-­‐purpose	  tokens,	  are	  not	  easy	  to	  
use,	   may	   have	   prohibitive	   costs	   associated	   with	  
them	  and	   almost	   always	   lack	   user	   control.	  We	  will	  
address	  these	  issues	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  remainder	  
of	  this	  section.	  
3.2 CLOSED	  SOLUTIONS	  
The	   most	   important	   issue	   with	   most	   current	  
solutions	   is	   that	   they	   are	   closed	   ecosystems.	   For	  
example,	   the	   majority	   of	   OTP	   tokens	   is	   based	   on	  
proprietary	   algorithms	   and	   can	   only	   be	   integrated	  
into	   applications	   by	   using	   servers	   or	   server-­‐side	  
components	  supplied	  by	  the	  token	  vendors.	  
Ironically,	   for	   PKI	   tokens	   it	   is	   even	   worse.	  
They	   always	   require	   integration	   software	   on	   the	  
client	   system	   in	   the	   form	   of	   cryptographic	  middle-­‐
ware	  (although	  they	  normally	  do	  not	  require	  server-­‐
side	   integration,	   since	   they	   are	   based	   on	   built-­‐in	  
X.509	  client	  authentication).	  If	  the	  tokens	  are	  smart	  
cards,	   they	   require	   smart	   card	   readers	   (which	   are	  
not	  commonly	  installed	  in	  systems	  apart	  from	  some	  
enterprise-­‐market	   laptops).	   And	   both	   smart	   card	  
readers	  as	  well	  as	  USB	   tokens	  may	  require	  specific	  
drivers	   before	   they	  will	   work	   although	   that	   is	   less	  
common	   nowadays	   with	   most	   of	   them	   supporting	  
the	  CCID	  [17]	  standard.	  
Because	   most	   solutions	   require	   proprietary	  
software,	   they	  are	  not	   easily	   integrated	  on	  all	   plat-­‐
forms	  (i.e.	  they	  will	  only	  work	  on	  vendor-­‐supported	  
platforms).	  
For	  OTP	  tokens,	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  OATH	  initia-­‐
tive	   brings	   hope	   since	   both	   the	   algorithms	   in	   the	  
tokens	  as	  well	  as	  the	  way	  that	  the	  token	  secrets	  are	  
distributed	   are	   now	   specified	   in	   open	   standards.	  
This	   makes	   it	   possible	   to	   develop	   the	   server-­‐side	  
integration	  software	   independent	  of	   the	   token	  ven-­‐
dor	  and	  allows	  these	  components	  to	  support	  tokens	  
from	  many	  vendors.	  There	   is	   already	  quite	   a	   bit	   of	  
uptake	  among	  token	  vendors.	  
In	  contrast,	  for	  PKI	  tokens,	  the	  situation	  is	  dif-­‐
ferent.	   Although	   there	   is	   an	   open	   source	   initiative	  
[21],	   this	   project	   has	  not	   really	   seen	   a	  wide	  use	  or	  
deployment	  and	  indeed	  most	  PKI	  token	  middleware	  
is	   still	   proprietary	   and	   closed.	   On	   a	   positive	   note,	  
PKI	  middleware	   at	   least	   adheres	   to	   the	   open	  PKCS	  
#11	  standard	  [22].	  
One	  final	  thing	  to	  mention	  is	  Mobile	  PKI.	  From	  
an	  integration	  perspective	  it	  is	  fully	  open,	  because	  it	  
is	  based	  on	  an	  open	  standard	  web	  service	  interface	  
called	  MSSP	   [23],	   [24],	   [25],	   [26].	   The	   downside	   is	  
that	   a	   special	   application	   needs	   to	   be	   installed	   on	  
the	  user’s	   SIM	  card.	  The	  mobile	  operator	  owns	   the	  
SIM	   card	   and	   access	   to	   it	   is	   strictly	   guarded.	   This	  
means	  that	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  deploy	  Mobile	  PKI	  
co-­‐operation	   of	   the	   mobile	   operator	   is	   required,	  
which	  has	  been	  proven	  to	  be	  difficult	  on	  many	  occa-­‐
sions.	  	  
3.3 SINGLE	  PURPOSE	  TOKENS	  
Almost	   all	   OTP	   tokens	   are	   single-­‐purpose	   to-­‐
kens	  by	  nature	  because	  they	  rely	  on	  a	  shared	  secret.	  
The	  tokens	  themselves	  can	  only	  contain	  one	  secret,	  
which	  means	  that	  they	  can	  only	  be	  paired	  with	  one	  
server.	   Unless	   the	   server	   is	   used	   as	   an	   authentica-­‐
tion	  service	  for	  multiple	  applications	  (which	  is	  very	  
rarely	  the	  case),	  the	  tokens	  can	  thus	  only	  be	  used	  for	  
a	  single	  purpose	  (e.g.	  to	  log	  in	  to	  online	  banking	  for	  
a	   single	   bank).	   This	   is	   very	   inconvenient	   for	   users,	  
and	  indeed	  many	  users	  will	  know	  the	  hassle	  of	  hav-­‐
ing	  more	   than	  one	   token	  because	   they	  are	   custom-­‐
ers	  at	  more	  than	  one	  bank.	  
In	  principle,	  PKI	   tokens	   should	  be	  more	   flexi-­‐
ble	  because	  they	  often	  support	  storage	  of	  more	  than	  
one	   X.509	   certificate	   together	   with	   the	   associated	  
key-­‐pair.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  issuance	  process	  of	  PKI	  
tokens	   is	   usually	   such	   that	   users	   have	   no	   control	  
over	   the	  content	  of	   their	   token	  and	  can	  very	  rarely	  
add	   credentials	   for	   additional	   identities.	   Thus,	   PKI	  
tokens	   can	   only	   be	   used	   for	   multiple	   purposes	   if	  
they	   contain	   an	   identity	   issued	  by	   a	  Certificate	  Au-­‐
thority	   that	   is	   supported	  by	   the	  party	   to	  which	   the	  
user	  is	  authenticating.	  
In	   theory,	   mobile	   App-­‐based	   solutions	   can	  
more	  easily	  support	  multi-­‐purpose	  deployments,	   in	  
practice	  this	  does	  not	  happen	  very	  often	  yet.	  
3.4 (LACK	  OF)	  EASE	  OF	  USE	  
Many	   users	   will	   have	   experienced	   how	   diffi-­‐
cult	   it	   can	   be	   to	   use	   OTP	   tokens.	  Most	   of	   them	   re-­‐
quire	   typing	   in	   complicated	   codes.	   The	   chal-­‐
lenge/response	   variety	   is	   even	   more	   complicated	  
where	   users	   regularly	   have	   to	   type	  multiple	   codes	  
on	   the	   token	  and	   then	   they	  have	   to	  copy	   the	  result	  
from	  the	  token	  by	  typing	   it	  on	  the	  site	  they	  are	  au-­‐
thenticating	  to.	  
SMS	  OTP	   is	   no	   better.	   In	   fact,	   it	   is	   even	  more	  
complicated	   in	   our	   opinion	   as	   the	   one-­‐time	   pass-­‐
words	  used	  often	  consist	  of	  both	  capitals	  and	  lower	  
case	  letters	  as	  well	  as	  digits	  and	  punctuation	  marks.	  
PKI	   tokens	   fare	   a	   little	   better.	   As	   long	   as	   the	  
software	   integration	   with	   the	   user’s	   browser	   is	  
properly	   installed,	   the	   user	   experience	   is	   usually	  
quite	  smooth.	  
A	   common	   issue	   shared	   by	   all	   tokens	   except	  
mobile	   phone-­‐based	   ones	   is	   that	   they	   are	   all	   too	  
easy	  to	  forget	  or	  lose.	  	  
3.5 COST	  
Both	  OTP	  and	  PKI	   tokens	   can	  be	  quite	   costly,	  
both	   in	   initial	   investment	   as	  well	   as	   yearly	   licence	  
fees.	   It	   is	   not	   uncommon	   to	   pay	   tens	   of	  US	   dollars	  
per	  user	  per	  year.	  SMS	  OTP	  becomes	  gradually	  more	  
costly	  the	  more	  it	  is	  used.	  
The	  only	  exception	  to	  this	  rule	  is	  a	  new	  class	  of	  
OTP	  tokens	  that	  are	  emerging,	  based	  on	  open	  stand-­‐
ards	  developed	  by	  the	  OATH	  initiative.	  Because	  they	  
work	  with	  open	  source	   software,	   the	  only	   substan-­‐
tial	   cost	   is	   the	   initial	   investment.	   Yubikey	   tokens	  
[27],	   for	   example,	   can	   be	   purchased	   for	   less	   than	  
USD	  $30	  and	  the	  price	  goes	  down	  for	  larger	  volume	  
purchases.	  
3.6 (LACK	  OF)	  USER	  CONTROL	  
Users	   seldom	   initiate	   deployment	   of	   two-­‐
factor	   authentication	   solutions.	   They	   are	   usually	  
deployed	   by	   corporate	   IT	   departments	   or	   banks.	  
The	   organisations	   deploying	   these	   tokens	   strictly	  
control	  what	  they	  can	  or	  cannot	  be	  used	  for,	  severe-­‐
ly	  limiting	  users.	  
It	   is	   very	   hard	   for	   users	   to	   acquire	   personal	  
two-­‐factor	   tokens	  and	  deploy	   them	   in	  a	  useful	  way	  
because	  very	  few	  services	  provide	  the	  means	  to	  self-­‐
enrol	  identities.	  A	  notable	  exception	  to	  this	  is	  Google	  
Authenticator	  [28].	  
4 CLASSIFICATION	   OF	   AUTHENTI-­‐
CATION	  SOLUTIONS	  
4.1 INTRODUCTION	  
In	   this	   section	  we	  will	   introduce	   six	   different	  
ways	  to	  classify	  authentication	  solutions	  in	  order	  to	  
judge	  their	  suitability.	  We	  will	  use	  this	  classification	  
at	   the	   end	   of	   this	   section	   to	   classify	   the	   two-­‐factor	  
authentication	  solutions	  discussed	  earlier.	  
4.2 HARDWARE	  INDEPENDENCE	  
The	   first	   way	   to	   classify	   authentication	   solu-­‐
tions	   is	   by	   their	   dependence	   (or	   lack	   thereof)	   on	  
specific	  or	  specialised	  hardware	  for	  their	  operation.	  	  
We	  feel	  that	  hardware	  independence	  enhances	  
the	   usability	   of	   a	   solution,	   because	   the	  more	   inde-­‐
pendent	   a	   solution	   is	   from	   specific	   hardware,	   the	  
fewer	  devices	  a	  user	  has	  to	  carry	  around.	  
From	   a	   security	   perspective,	   however,	   using	  
special	   purpose-­‐made	   hardware	   has	   distinct	   ad-­‐
vantages.	  Devices	  can	  be	  tailored	  for	  one	  goal,	  which	  
is	   to	   protect	   the	   secrets	   associated	   with	   a	   user’s	  
credentials.	  
In	   this	  paper,	  we	  will	   focus	  mainly	  on	   the	  en-­‐
hanced	   usability	   that	   comes	   with	   hardware	   inde-­‐
pendence;	  we	  will	   factor	  in	  the	  security	  advantages	  
that	   special	  hardware	  can	  offer	  when	  we	   judge	   the	  
security	   of	   a	   solution.	  We	   rank	   solutions	   that	   offer	  
stronger	   hardware	   independence	   more	   favourably	  
than	   solutions	   that	   require	   specific	   hardware	   to	  
operate.	  
4.3 SOFTWARE	  INDEPENDENCE	  
Just	   like	  hardware	  independence,	  software	  in-­‐
dependence	   is	  mainly	   a	  usability	   enhancing	  aspect.	  
In	   some	   cases,	   dependence	   on	   specific	   hardware	  
goes	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   dependence	   on	   specific	  
software.	   For	   example,	   smart	   cards	   cannot	   operate	  
without	  the	  accompanying	  security	  middleware	  that	  
users	  will	  have	  to	  install	  on	  their	  computer.	  
Some	   solutions	   only	   depend	   on	   specific	   soft-­‐
ware	  on	  the	  server	  side	  and	  do	  not	  require	  the	  user	  
to	  install	  software	  (for	  example	  OTP	  tokens).	  
We	  will	  judge	  solutions	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  effort	  
required	   to	   install	   software	   by	   both	   end	   users	   as	  
well	   as	   by	   the	   system	   administrators	   of	   the	   server	  
side.	  We	  will	  also	  factor	  in	  the	  availability	  of	  integra-­‐
tion	  in	  off-­‐the-­‐shelf	  products	  as	  this	  can	  significantly	  
reduce	   the	   effort	   required	   to	   install	   the	   required	  
software.	  
4.4 SECURITY	  
Security	   is	   –	   of	   course	   –	   one	   of	   the	  most	   im-­‐
portant	   factors	   when	   judging	   authentication	   solu-­‐
tions.	  
There	   are	   several	   aspects	   that	   influence	   the	  
security	  of	  a	  solution:	  
 Is	  the	  solution	  a	  multi-­‐factor	  solution?	  If	  so,	  is	  
it	   a	   true	  multi-­‐factor	   solution	   (see	   §2.3)	   or	   a	  
hybrid	  solution	  (see	  §2.4)?	  
 Does	   the	   solution	   rely	   on	  purpose-­‐built	   hard-­‐
ware	   that	   has	   provisions	   for	   e.g.	   tamper	   re-­‐
sistance?	  
 Are	   there	   well-­‐known	   attacks	   that	   (severely)	  
impact	  the	  security?	  
 If	   the	   solution	   relies	   on	   cryptography,	   does	   it	  
rely	   on	   sufficiently	   strong	   as	   well	   as	   open	  
cryptography?	  
 Has	   the	   security	   of	   the	   solution	   been	   verified	  
by	  reputable	  independent	  security	  auditors?	  
4.5 COST	  
Cost	   is	   an	   important	   factor,	   especially	   for	  
large-­‐scale	  deployments.	   It	   can	  be	   considered	   from	  
a	  number	  of	  different	  angles:	  
 The	   one-­‐time	   setup	   cost	   (e.g.	   in	   software	   and	  
hardware	  purchases)	  and	  recurring	  cost	  of	  the	  
actual	  solution	  (e.g.	  yearly	  licence	  fees).	  
 The	   cost	   for	   troubleshooting	   for	   users	   who	  
have	  misplaced	   their	   credentials	   or	   forgotten	  
their	  password	  or	  PIN.	  
 The	  cost	  of	   integrating	  the	  solution	  into	  exist-­‐
ing	   IT	   infrastructure	   (what	   skill	   level	   is	   re-­‐
quired	  and	  how	  much	  time	  do	  system	  adminis-­‐
trators	  or	  system	  integrators	  spend	  setting	  up	  
the	  solution).	  
4.6 OPEN	  STANDARDS	  COMPLIANCE	  
Open	   standards	   form	   the	   backbone	   of	   the	   In-­‐
ternet.	  Vendors	  implement	  these	  standards	  that	  are	  
available	   free-­‐of-­‐charge	   or	   for	   a	   reasonable	   fee	   to	  
guarantee	  interoperability	  with	  systems	  from	  other	  
vendors.	  	  
There	  is	  a	  whole	  host	  of	  open	  standards	  in	  the	  
authentication	  arena	  that	  make	  it	  easier	  to	  integrate	  
solutions	   into	   existing	   IT	   infrastructure.	   They	   also	  
offer	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  vendor	  independence	  as	  one	  
solution	  can	  be	  more	  easily	  exchanged	   for	  another.	  
Of	   course,	   this	   also	   depends	   on	   the	   level	   to	   which	  
open	  standards	  have	  been	   integrated.	  For	  example:	  
OTP	  tokens	  that	  fully	  support	  the	  open	  standards	  of	  
the	  Open	  Authentication	   Initiative	   can	  easily	  be	   in-­‐
tegrated	  with	   server-­‐side	   software	   from	  a	   range	  of	  
vendors	  that	  support	  these	  standards.	  On	  the	  other	  
hand,	  PKI	  tokens	  that	  rely	  on	  PKCS	  #11	  middleware	  
are	   less	  easily	  replaced	  by	  another	  solution	  as	  they	  
will	   require	   specific	   middleware	   supplied	   by	   the	  
token	  vendor.	  
For	   a	   long	   time	   supporting	   open	   standards	  
was	   not	   common	   practice,	   especially	   among	   OTP	  
token	  vendors.	  Fortunately,	  this	  is	  now	  changing	  for	  
the	  better	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  consortia	  like	  the	  Open	  
Authentication	  Initiative.	  
4.7 EASE-­‐OF-­‐USE	  
A	  final	   factor	   that	  can	  go	  a	   long	  way	   in	  deter-­‐
mining	   the	   success	   of	   a	   solution	   is	   ease-­‐of-­‐use.	   At	  
first	   glance,	   solutions	   that	   are	   already	   familiar	   to	   a	  
user	   –	   such	   as	   username/password	   –	   may	   seem	  
easy-­‐to-­‐use.	  But	  when	  all	  the	  kludges	  that	  have	  been	  
added	   to	   enhance	   the	   security	   such	   as	   complex	  
password	   policies	   and	   requirements	   to	   change	  
passwords	   on	   a	   regular	   basis	   are	   considered,	   it	   is	  
easy	  to	  see	  that	  such	  solutions	  may	  not	  be	  as	  easy-­‐
to-­‐use	  as	  initially	  assumed.	  
Other	  things	  that	  need	  to	  be	  factored	  in	  when	  
considering	  the	  ease-­‐of-­‐use	  of	  a	  solution	  are:	  
 Does	   the	   solution	   require	   the	   user	   to	   carry	  
around	  additional	  devices	   (that	  he/she	  other-­‐
wise	  would	  not	  need	  to	  operate	  their	  comput-­‐
er)?	  
 Does	   the	   user	   have	   to	   re-­‐type	   complicated	  
codes	   (such	   as	   may	   be	   the	   case	   for	   OTP	   to-­‐
kens)?	  
 Has	  care	  been	  taken	  to	  design	  the	  user	  experi-­‐
ence	  such	   that	   the	  solution	  can	  be	  used	   intui-­‐
tively	   by	   the	   user	   rather	   than	   requiring	   them	  
to	  learn	  how	  to	  operate	  the	  solution	  from	  e.g.	  a	  
manual?	  
4.8 CLASSIFICATION	  
Table	   1	   below	   shows	   the	   scores	   we	   have	   as-­‐
signed	   to	   each	   solution	   described	   in	   section	   2	   for	  
each	   of	   the	   6	   different	   classification	   categories	   de-­‐
scribed	  earlier;	  we	  used	  a	  five	  point	  scoring	  system	  
ranging	   from	   ++	   (indicating	   that	   a	   solution	   is	   (one	  
of)	  the	  best	  in	  class	  for	  the	  given	  classification	  cate-­‐
gory)	  to	  -­‐-­‐	  (indicating	  that	  a	  solution	  has	  very	  unfa-­‐
vourable	   characteristics	   compared	   to	   other	   solu-­‐
tions	  in	  the	  given	  classification	  category).	  Any	  scor-­‐
ing	  system	  is,	  of	  course,	  subjective;	  we	  endeavour	  to	  










Usern./pwd	   ++	   ++	   -­‐-­‐	   ++	   =	   +/-­‐	  
OTP	  token	   -­‐	   -­‐	   ++	   -­‐-­‐	   -­‐/=	   +	  
C/R	  token	   -­‐	   -­‐	   ++	   -­‐-­‐	   -­‐/=	   +	  
PKI	  token	   -­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐	   ++	   -­‐-­‐	   =	   +	  
Mobile	  PKI	   +	   +	   ++	   ?	   +	   ++	  
SMS	  OTP	   +	   =	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐-­‐	   -­‐	  
OTP	  Apps	   +	   +/=	   +	   +/=	   +/=	   =	  
Table	  1	  -­‐	  Classification	  of	  authentication	  solutions	  
4.9 JUSTIFICATION	  
We	  would	  like	  to	  highlight	  certain	  points	  of	  the	  
classification	  we	  made	   in	   the	  previous	  section.	  Giv-­‐
en	   the	   endless	   stream	   of	   news	   articles	   about	  
username/password	   getting	   compromised	   we	   feel	  
that	  –	  even	  though	  it	  is	  tried	  and	  tested	  –	  this	  para-­‐
digm	  is	  really	  lacking	  in	  security.	  And	  even	  if	  organi-­‐
sations	  enforce	  secure	  password	  policies	  and	  users	  
adhere	   to	   them,	   they	   may	   still	   be	   at	   risk.	   Recent	  
developments	   in	   password	   cracking	   such	   as	   using	  
GPU-­‐based	   cracking	   systems	   make	   the	   security	   of	  
any	   password	   under	   a	   certain	   length	   questionable	  
[45].	  With	  the	  increasing	  value	  that	  online	  identities	  
have	  (how	  would	  you	  feel	   if	  your	  GMail,	  your	  Face-­‐
Book	  or	  your	  Twitter	  account	  got	  compromised	  and	  
someone	  reads	  your	  private	  data	  or	   tries	   to	   imper-­‐
sonate	  you?)	  we,	  as	  authors,	  are	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  
two-­‐factor	   authentication	   should	   become	   much	  
more	  common	  than	  it	  is	  now.	  
As	   the	   classification	   shows,	   to	   get	   rock	   solid	  
security	  using	  two-­‐factor	  authentication	  we	  feel	  that	  
a	  real	  purpose-­‐built	  hardware	  token	  should	  be	  used.	  
Nevertheless,	   emerging	   solutions	   that	   rely	   on	   mo-­‐
bile	  phones	  as	  personal	  devices,	   such	  as	  OTP	  Apps,	  
show	  great	  promise.	  If	  implemented	  properly,	  these	  
solutions	  can	  add	  significant	  value	  security-­‐wise.	  
There	  are	  three	  key	  problems	  currently	  inhib-­‐
iting	  wide-­‐scale	  deployment	  of	  two-­‐factor	  authenti-­‐
cation	   outside	   of	   the	   corporate	   and	   banking	   envi-­‐
ronment.	   The	   first	   is	   cost;	  OTP	   and	  PKI	   tokens	   are	  
expensive	   (there	   are	   exceptions:	   interestingly,	   one	  
of	   the	   largest	   deployments	   of	   OTP	   tokens	   is	   for	  
online	   World-­‐of-­‐Warcraft	   [41]).	   The	   second	   is	   de-­‐
pendence	  on	  bespoke	  hard-­‐	  and	  software.	  Especially	  
PKI	   tokens	   suffer	   from	   the	   problem	   that	   they	   re-­‐
quire	   the	   end-­‐user	   to	   install	   driver	   software	   and	  
security	  middleware	  that	  is	  not	  always	  available	  for	  
all	  end-­‐user	  platforms.	  
Finally,	   the	   last	   problem	   is	   the	   lack	   of	   adher-­‐
ence	   to	  open	  standards.	  This	  not	  only	  stops	  people	  
integrating	   support	   for	   two-­‐factor	   authentication	  
into	   their	   online	   services,	   it	   also	  means	   that	  many	  
two-­‐factor	   products	   are	   single	   purpose	   only	   (e.g.	   a	  
token	  issued	  by	  a	  bank	  cannot	  be	  used	  to	  authenti-­‐
cate	  for	  other	  services).	  
We	  have	  tried	  to	  let	  these	  three	  problems	  be	  
reflected	  in	  the	  classification	  given	  in	  Table	  1.	  
5 tiqr:	   EXAMPLE	   OF	   AN	   OPEN	   AP-­‐
PROACH	  
5.1 INTRODUCTION	  
In	   2009	   we	   experimented	   with	   Mobile	   PKI	  
(see	  also	  §2.3.3)	  as	  a	  means	  of	  authentication.	  As	  the	  
report	   [8]	   of	   our	   experiment	   shows,	  we	  were	   very	  
happy	   with	   the	   results.	   The	   technology	   is	   user-­‐
friendly,	   very	   secure	   and	   –	   because	   of	   the	   open	  
standards	  it	  is	  based	  on	  –	  easy	  to	  integrate.	  
The	  only	  major	  hurdle	  we	   encountered	   is	   the	  
dependence	   on	   mobile	   operators.	   These	   operators	  
are	   very	   hesitant	   about	   deploying	   the	   technology	  
because	  it	  requires	  a	  SIM	  swap	  (most	  SIMs	  deployed	  
in	   The	   Netherlands	   are	   not	   PKI	   capable),	   and	   be-­‐
cause	  they	  do	  not	  feel	  that	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  business	  
case	   to	  deploy	   the	   technology	   in	   terms	  of	  potential	  
revenue	  from	  it.	  
As	  operator	  of	  the	  National	  Research	  and	  Edu-­‐
cation	   Network	   (NREN)	   in	   The	   Netherlands,	  
SURFnet	   operates	   a	   so-­‐called	   identity	   federation	  
(see	  [29])	  called	  SURFfederatie.	  This	  federation	  ena-­‐
bles	  users	   to	   log	   in	  at	  a	  multitude	  of	  online	  service	  
providers	   using	   a	   single	   identity	   hosted	   by	   their	  
home	   institution.	   Furthermore,	   this	   federation	   of-­‐
fers	  users	  single	  sign-­‐on.	  
As	   is	   the	   case	  on	  most	  of	   the	   Internet,	   almost	  
all	   authentications	   in	   the	  SURFfederatie	   rely	  on	   the	  
tried	   and	   tested	   username/password	   mechanism.	  
We	  would	  like	  to	  improve	  on	  this	  situation	  by	  intro-­‐
ducing	  alternative	  means	  of	  authentication	  based	  on	  
two-­‐factor	  authentication	  technology.	  There	  are	  two	  
reasons	   for	   this:	   first,	   we	   feel	   that	   some	   services	  
require	   a	   stronger	   form	   of	   authentication	   than	  
username/password.	   Secondly,	   we	   would	   like	   to	  
offer	   users	   a	   safe	   alternative	   that	   they	   can	   use	   on	  
untrusted	   systems	  such	  as,	   for	   instance,	   computers	  
in	  Internet	  cafés.	  
SURFfederatie	   has	   a	   sizable	   and	   very	   hetero-­‐
geneous	  user	  population	  consisting	  of	  approximate-­‐
ly	  one	  million	  students,	   researchers	  and	  other	  staff	  
from	   over	   a	   160	   different	   institutions.	   It	   would	   be	  
impossible	   to	   deploy	   a	   token-­‐based	   two-­‐factor	   au-­‐
thentication	   solution	   because	   of	   the	   logistics	   in-­‐
volved.	   It	  would,	   however,	   be	   ideal	   if	  we	   could	  de-­‐
ploy	  a	  secure	  two-­‐factor	  authentication	  system	  that	  
uses	   mobile	   phones.	   Almost	   everyone	   owns	   a	   mo-­‐
bile	  phone	  (in	  fact,	  in	  The	  Netherlands,	  a	  country	  of	  
16.5	  million	  people,	  there	  are	  over	  19	  million	  active	  
mobile	  subscriptions	  [30])	  and	  users	  are	  very	  moti-­‐
vated	  to	  carry	  their	  mobile	  phone	  at	  all	  times	  [31].	  
For	   reasons	   mentioned	   before,	   we	   could	   not	  
rely	   on	  Mobile	   PKI	   so	   we	   started	   searching	   for	   an	  
alternative.	   The	   criteria	   for	   this	   alternative	   were	  
that	   it	   should	   be	   secure,	   user-­‐friendly,	   easy	   to	   de-­‐
ploy,	  open	  and	  suitable	  for	  managing	  multiple	  iden-­‐
tities.	   We	   believe	   that	   we	   have	   developed	   a	   novel	  
solution	  that	  meets	  all	  of	  these	  criteria.	  
5.2 THE	  CONCEPT	  
5.2.1 BASIC	  FEATURES	  USED	  
The	  concept	  we	  call	  tiqr	  is	  based	  on	  three	  fea-­‐
tures	  of	  modern	  smartphones:	  
 The	  ability	  to	  run	  Apps	  
 A	  camera	  
 Internet	  connectivity	  
5.2.2 QR	  CODES	  
Relying	   on	   these	   smartphone	   features	   allows	  
tiqr	  to	  make	  use	  of	  two-­‐dimensional	  barcodes	  called	  
QR	  codes.	  They	  were	  invented	  by	  Toyota	  subsidiary	  
Denso-­‐Wave	  in	  the	  1990s.	  
	  
Figure	  3	  -­‐	  a	  QR	  code	  with	  specific	  features	  highlighted	  
(source	  [9])	  
Although	  patented,	  QR	  codes	  can	  be	  used	  roy-­‐
alty	  free.	  The	  technology	  behind	  the	  codes	  has	  been	  
standardised	  as	   ISO/IEC	  18004:2006.	  Up	   to	  4KB	  of	  
alphanumeric	   data	   can	   be	   stored	   in	   the	   codes	   and	  
numerous	   libraries	   are	   available	   that	   can	   extract	  
information	   contained	   in	   a	   QR	   code	   from	   images	  
captured	   by	   a	   camera.	   For	   more	   details	   about	   QR	  
codes,	   we	   refer	   readers	   to	   the	   excellent	  Wikipedia	  
article	  [9].	  
QR	  codes	  have	  become	  quite	  popular,	  because	  
most	   phones	   are	   equipped	   with	   cameras	   and	   can	  
run	  QR	  code	  reader	  software.	  The	  codes	  are	  almost	  
exclusively	   used	   in	   a	   static	   fashion,	   for	   instance	   in	  
advertising	  or	  on	  public	  transport	  stops.	  They	  usual-­‐
ly	  contain	  an	  encoded	  URL	  that	  QR	  code	  readers	  can	  
open	  in	  a	  mobile	  browser.	  
The	  innovation	  we	  have	  come	  up	  with	  is	  to	  use	  
QR	  codes	   in	  a	  dynamic	  rather	   than	  a	  static	   fashion.	  
By	  encoding	  a	  challenge	  in	  a	  dynamically	  generated	  
QR	  code	   that	   is	  displayed	   to	   the	  user	  when	  he/she	  
wants	   to	   log	   in,	  we	  use	  QR	   codes	   to	   take	   away	   the	  
burden	   on	   users	   of	   typing	   challenge/response	  
codes.	  QR	  codes	  are	  also	  used	  during	  enrolment	   to	  
tie	   the	   user’s	   phone	   to	   an	   identity.	   Although	   this	  
solution	   is	   not	   unique	   –	   the	   Google	   Authenticator	  
App	   [28]	   can	  use	  a	  QR	  code	   to	   convey	   the	  user	   se-­‐
cret	  during	  enrolment	  –	  we	  have	  taken	  this	  technol-­‐
ogy	  further	  by	  creating	  a	  seamless	  user	  experience.	  
5.2.3 THE	  TIQR	  USER	  EXPERIENCE	  
To	   illustrate	   how	   tiqr	   works,	   we	   will	   go	  
through	  the	  tiqr	  user	  experience	  during	  authentica-­‐
tion	  (assume	  for	  now	  that	  a	  user	  already	  has	  a	  tiqr-­‐
enabled	  account).	  
The	   flow	  starts	  by	  a	  user	  surfing	   to	  a	  website	  
that	  requires	  them	  to	  log	  in.	  Where	  most	  sites	  would	  
display	   a	   username/password	   dialog	   (or	   an	   entry	  
field	  to	  enter	  a	  one-­‐time	  password),	  with	  tiqr	  users	  
will	  see	  a	  QR	  tag	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  4.	  
	  
Figure	  4	  -­‐	  tiqr	  login	  page	  showing	  a	  QR	  code	  
Contained	   in	   the	   QR	   code	   is	   a	   challenge.	   The	  
user	   now	   launches	   the	   tiqr	   App	   on	   their	  
smartphone.	   The	   App	   will	   activate	   the	   camera	   al-­‐
lowing	  the	  user	  to	  scan	  the	  QR	  code.	  
	  
Figure	  5	  -­‐	  the	  user	  scans	  the	  QR	  code	  with	  the	  tiqr	  App	  
Apart	   from	   a	   random	   challenge,	   the	   QR	   code	  
also	   contains	   information	   on	   the	   relying	   party	   re-­‐
questing	   authentication.	  The	  App	   can	  manage	  mul-­‐
tiple	  identities	  and	  will	  select	  an	  appropriate	  identi-­‐
ty	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  log	  in	  to	  this	  particular	  site	  (if	  
multiple	   identities	   are	   present,	   the	   user	   will	   see	   a	  
list	   and	   can	   choose	   the	   appropriate	   one).	   The	   tiqr	  
App	  now	  asks	  the	  user	  to	  confirm	  that	  he/she	  wants	  
to	  log	  in,	  also	  displaying	  the	  domain	  name	  of	  the	  site	  
they	  are	   logging	  in	  to	   in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  of	  
phishing.	  
	  
Figure	  6	  -­‐	  tiqr	  asks	  for	  user	  confirmation	  
Once	   the	   user	   has	   confirmed	   their	   identity,	  
they	  will	   be	   asked	   to	   enter	   their	   PIN	   code	   (the	   se-­‐
cond	  factor).	  
	  
Figure	  7	  -­‐	  user	  entering	  their	  PIN	  
The	  user	   is	  helped	   in	  remembering	  his	  or	  her	  
PIN	  by	  means	  of	   animal	   icons	  displayed	   in	   the	  PIN	  
entry	  dialog.	  Errors	  made	  during	  PIN	  entry	  (such	  as	  
swapping	   two	  digits	   or	   a	   completely	  different	  PIN)	  
will	   lead	   to	   a	   different	   sequence	   being	   displayed.	  
When	  the	  user	  presses	  OK,	  login	  will	  proceed.	  If	  the	  
user’s	   phone	   is	   online,	   the	   Internet	   connection	   of	  
the	  phone	  will	  be	  used	  to	  submit	  the	  response	  to	  the	  
authenticating	   server	   thus	   obviating	   the	   need	   to	  
type	  one-­‐time	  passwords	  in	  to	  a	  website.	  When	  au-­‐
thentication	   is	   successful,	   the	   user	   is	   notified	   both	  
on	   the	  phone	  as	  well	   as	  by	   the	  website	  proceeding	  
with	   login	   by	   redirecting	   the	   user	   to	   the	   protected	  
content	  as	  shown	  in	  the	  screenshot	  (Figure	  8).	  
	  
Figure	  8	  -­‐	  the	  user	  has	  successfully	  logged	  in	  
In	   case	  no	   Internet	   connection	   is	   available	  on	  
the	  phone	  a	  fall-­‐back	  scenario	  is	  used	  where	  a	  one-­‐
time	   password	   is	   displayed	   on	   the	   phone	   for	   the	  
user	   to	   type	   into	   the	  website	   (more	  on	   this	   in	   sec-­‐
tion	  5.8).	  
5.2.4 FROM	  PROOF-­‐OF-­‐CONCEPT	  TO	  PRODUCT	  
We	  first	  came	  up	  with	   the	  concept	   that	   led	   to	  
the	  development	  of	  tiqr	  in	  September	  2010.	  In	  order	  
to	  prove	  that	  the	  concept	  would	  work,	  we	  designed	  
the	   initial	   protocol	   and	   developed	   a	   proof-­‐of-­‐
concept	   implementation,	   both	  of	   the	   server	   side	   as	  
well	   as	   of	   the	  phone	   side.	   For	   the	  proof-­‐of-­‐concept	  
an	  implementation	  was	  created	  for	  Apple’s	  iOS	  plat-­‐
form.	  
The	  proof-­‐of-­‐concept	  quickly	   showed	   that	   the	  
technology	  worked	  very	  well.	  We	   first	  demonstrat-­‐
ed	   the	   working	   proof-­‐of-­‐concept	   at	   an	   event	   held	  
every	   two	   years	   to	   showcase	   SURFnet	   innovations	  
to	  our	  connected	  institutions	  in	  December	  2010	  and	  
received	   helpful	   and	   positive	   feedback	   from	   the	  
people	   attending.	   This	   led	   us	   to	   decide	   that	   we	  
should	  continue	  development.	  
In	  April	   2011	  we	   released	   the	   first	   Apple	   iOS	  
production	   version	   in	   the	  Apple	  App	   Store	   and	  we	  
presented	   on	   the	   project	   at	   the	   Internet2	   Spring	  
Member	  Meeting	  in	  Arlington,	  VA.	  The	  Android	  ver-­‐
sion	  was	   released	   in	  May	  2011	   just	  before	  we	  pre-­‐
sented	   on	   further	   improvements	   to	   tiqr	   at	   the	  
TERENA	   Networking	   Conference	   2011	   in	   Prague,	  
Czech	  Republic.	  
The	  remainder	  of	  this	  section	  will	  go	  into	  more	  
detail	  about	  the	  tiqr	  technology.	  
5.3 MOBILE	  APPS	  
5.3.1 PLATFORMS	  
We	  wanted	   to	  make	   tiqr	   available	  on	   the	   two	  
most	  common	  smart	  phone	  platforms.	  According	  to	  
a	   Q1	   2011	  market	   survey,	   those	   platforms	   are	   Ap-­‐
ple’s	  iOS	  and	  Google’s	  Android	  platform:	  
	  
Figure	  9	  -­‐	  smart	  phone	  market,	  source:	  The	  Guardi-­‐
an/Kantar	  
We	  have	   developed	  Apps	   for	   both	   these	   plat-­‐
forms.	  The	  Apps	  rely	  on	  the	  excellent	  ZXing	  QR	  code	  
library	  developed	  by	  Google	  (see	  [18])	   for	  QR	  code	  
detection	   and	   decoding.	   The	   Apps	   implement	   the	  
tiqr	  challenge/response	  protocol,	  which	  is	  based	  on	  
OCRA/HOTP	  [19],	  [2];	  more	  information	  on	  the	  pro-­‐
tocol	  can	  be	  found	  in	  section	  5.5.	  
5.3.2 APP	  SECURITY	  CONSIDERATIONS	  
The	   tiqr	   protocol	   relies	   on	   shared	   secrets	   for	  
the	  challenge/response	   implementation.	  The	  secret	  
is	  stored	  both	  on	  the	  phone	  as	  well	  as	  on	  the	  server.	  	  
We	  can	  only	  reasonably	  assume	  that	  the	  phone	  
with	  the	  App	  and	  the	  secret	  on	  it	  is	  a	  secure	  authen-­‐
tication	   factor	   if	   it	   is	   hard	   for	   an	   attacker	   to	   gain	  
access	  to	  the	  actual	  secret.	  We	  therefore	  protect	  the	  
secrets	   belonging	   to	   user	   identities	   by	   encrypting	  
the	  secrets	  using	  PKCS	  #5	  password-­‐based	  encryp-­‐
tion	  [20].	  The	  basis	  for	  encryption	  is	  the	  4-­‐digit	  PIN	  
code	  the	  user	  chooses	  for	  the	  identity.	  	  
Of	   course	   there	   are	   only	   10000	   possible	   PIN	  
codes	  with	  a	  4-­‐digit	  PIN.	  We	  assume	   that	   it	   is	   easy	  
for	   a	   motivated	   attacker	   to	   gain	   access	   to	   the	   en-­‐
crypted	   secret	   so	   we	   need	   to	   protect	   it	   against	  
brute-­‐force	  attacks.	  We	  achieve	  this	  by	  applying	  two	  
principles.	  Firstly,	   the	  encrypted	  secret	  contains	  no	  
internal	  structure	  (i.e.	  only	  the	  secret	  key	  –	  which	  is	  
assumed	  to	  be	  truly	  random	  –	  is	  encrypted,	  there	  is	  
no	   formatting	   around	   the	   key	   data	   before	   it	   is	   en-­‐
crypted).	  This	  automatically	   leads	  to	  a	  second	   level	  
of	   protection:	   because	   the	   encrypted	   key	   has	   no	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correct	  PIN	  was	  used	  to	  decrypt	  the	  secret	  since	  the	  
decrypted	  data	  will	  look	  like	  random	  data	  in	  all	  cas-­‐
es.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this,	  only	  the	  server	  can	  check	  if	  the	  
correct	  PIN	  was	   entered	  because	   the	   computed	   re-­‐
sponse	   is	   only	   valid	   if	   the	   correct	   secret	   key	   was	  
used.	  	  
To	  prevent	  online	  attacks,	  we	  recommend	  that	  
the	  server	  block	  an	  account	  after	  a	  pre-­‐set	  number	  
of	   failed	   authentication	   attempts	   (in	   fact	   our	   demo	  
implementation	   blocks	   an	   account	   after	   3	   failed	  
attempts).	  Depending	  on	   the	  desired	   security	   level,	  
the	   server	  administrator	  may	  also	  decide	   to	   imple-­‐
ment	  some	  form	  of	  exponential	  back	  off	  mechanism	  
to	  mitigate	  brute-­‐force	  attacks.	   In	   this	   scenario,	   ac-­‐
counts	   are	   temporarily	   blocked	   after	   a	   failed	   login	  
attempt.	  This	  thwarts	  brute-­‐force	  attacks	  but	  is	  also	  
more	  user	   friendly	   for	   legitimate	  users	  since	  enter-­‐
ing	   the	  wrong	   PIN	  more	   than	   a	   certain	   number	   of	  
times	   will	   not	   immediately	   lead	   to	   a	   blocked	   ac-­‐
count.	  
5.3.3 APP	  USER	  EXPERIENCE	  
One	  of	   our	  main	   goals	  was	   to	   create	   an	   easy-­‐
to-­‐use	  system.	  We	  have	  taken	  special	  care	  to	  ensure	  
that	   the	   user	   experience	   of	   the	   App	   is	   as	   straight-­‐
forward,	   self-­‐explanatory	   and	   smooth	   as	   possible.	  	  
The	   prototype	   developed	   for	   the	   proof-­‐of-­‐concept	  
was	   handed	   over	   to	   user-­‐interface	   designers.	   They	  
studied	  the	  concept	  and	  the	  prototype	  implementa-­‐
tion.	  Using	  storyboards,	  they	  designed	  an	  optimised	  
user	  workflow.	  The	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  workflow	  is	  to	  
make	  it	  self-­‐evident	  to	  the	  user	  what	  the	  next	  logical	  
step	  is	  going	  to	  be.	  Another	  change	  they	  introduced	  
was	  to	  do	  away	  with	  a	  separate	  enrolment	  workflow	  
(in	   the	  prototype,	  we	  had	   two	   completely	   separate	  
workflows	   for	   enrolment	   and	   authentication).	   In	  
stead,	  the	  user	  just	  scans	  the	  QR	  code	  that	  is	  shown	  
and	  information	  in	  the	  code	  determines	  whether	  an	  
authentication	  or	  an	  enrolment	  workflow	  is	  going	  to	  
be	  followed.	  
Another	  design	  decision	  that	  was	  made	  was	  to	  
try	   to	   steer	   users	   toward	  using	   the	   same	  PIN	   code	  
for	   all	   the	   identities	  managed	   by	   the	   tiqr	   App.	   The	  
reasoning	  behind	   this	   is	   that	   the	  user-­‐interface	  de-­‐
signers	   feel	   that	   it	   is	   counter-­‐intuitive	   for	  most	  us-­‐
ers	   to	   have	  multiple	   PIN	   codes	   in	   a	   single	   applica-­‐
tion.	   This	   concept	   is	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   very	   subtly	  
integrated	   in	   the	   user	   experience	   by	   using	   sugges-­‐
tive	  wording	   (i.e.	  when	  enroling	  a	  new	   identity	  us-­‐
ing	  the	  text	  “Please	  enter	  your	  PIN”	  when	  they	  have	  
to	   choose	   a	   new	   PIN	   for	   the	   identity	   rather	   than	  
“Please	   choose	   a	   new	   PIN”).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	  
has	  also	  been	  taken	  quite	  far	  in	  that	  if	  a	  single	  iden-­‐
tity	  becomes	  blocked	  due	  to	  entering	  the	  wrong	  PIN	  
too	  many	   times,	   the	   App	  will	   block	   all	   identities	   it	  
manages.	  We	  have	  not	  had	  sufficient	  user	   feedback	  
to	  be	  able	  to	  decide	  whether	  or	  not	  this	  was	  a	  good	  
choice;	   so	   far,	   we	   have	   had	   some	   feedback	   from	  
third	  party	  developers	  that	  they	  feel	  this	  to	  be	  a	  bad	  
choice.	  We	  hope	  to	  learn	  more	  in	  a	  pilot	  implemen-­‐
tation	  that	  we	  are	  planning	  for	  the	  fall	  of	  2011.	  
One	   final	   thing	   to	  note	  about	   the	  user	  experi-­‐
ence	  is	  that	  we	  integrated	  an	  aide-­‐memoire	   into	  the	  
PIN	   entry	  dialog.	  We	  use	   icons	  with	   animal	   shapes	  
to	   help	   the	   user	   remember	   their	   PIN	   (as	   shown	   in	  
the	  figure	  below).	  
	  
Figure	  10	  -­‐	  PIN	  entry	  showing	  animal	  reminders	  
If	   the	   user	   enters	   the	   correct	   PIN,	   the	   same	  
four	   animal	   icons	   should	   show	  up	   in	   the	  PIN	  entry	  
field.	   Users	   can	   either	   remember	   the	   whole	   se-­‐
quence	   or	   elect	   to	   remember	   just	   the	   last	   icon.	   To	  
ensure	   that	   the	   sequence	   changes	   when	   common	  
PIN	  entry	  mistakes	  are	  made	  (such	  as	  swapping	  two	  
digits)	  we	  use	  the	  Verhoeff	  checksum	  algorithm	  [32]	  
for	  error	  detection.	  
5.4 SERVER	  SIDE	  
5.4.1 REQUIREMENTS	  
As	  was	  already	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  sec-­‐
tion,	  the	  basis	  for	  tiqr	  is	  challenge/response	  authen-­‐
tication	  using	   shared	   secrets	   (more	   information	  on	  
the	   protocol	   can	   be	   found	   in	   section	   5.5).	   This	  
means	   that	   the	   secret	   key	   information	   that	   is	   pre-­‐
sent	   on	   the	   phone	   also	   needs	   to	   be	   stored	   on	   the	  
server.	  
This,	   of	   course,	   puts	   certain	   requirements	   on	  
the	   server	   implementation.	   User	   secrets	   should	   be	  
stored	  encrypted,	  either	  on	  disk	  in	  a	  database	  or	  in	  a	  
Hardware	  Security	  Module	  (HSM).	  
Another	   thing	   that	   is	   required	   on	   the	   server	  
side	  is	  a	  library	  that	  generates	  the	  QR	  codes	  used	  to	  
convey	   the	   challenge	   to	   the	   user.	   There	   are	   good	  
open	   source	   implementations	   available	   for	   most	  
common	  web	   application	   platforms.	   For	   our	   refer-­‐
ence	  implementation	  we	  use	  PHP	  QR	  Code	  [33].	  
The	  most	   important	   thing	   to	   pay	   attention	   to	  
on	  the	  server	  side	  is	  that	  the	  protocol	  is	  implement-­‐
ed	   correctly.	   We	   provide	   a	   reference	   implementa-­‐
tion	  to	  show	  how	  the	  protocol	  works	  (which	  is	  dis-­‐
cussed	  in	  the	  next	  section).	  
5.4.2 REFERENCE	  IMPLEMENTATION	  
To	  give	  developers	  a	  head	  start	  at	   integrating	  
tiqr	  into	  their	  application,	  we	  have	  developed	  a	  ref-­‐
erence	   implementation	   in	   PHP.	   This	   reference	   im-­‐
plementation	   shows	   how	   the	   tiqr	   protocol	   works	  
(see	  section	  5.5).	  	  
We	  did	  not	  put	  any	  security	  provisions	   in	   the	  
reference	   implementation	   so	   it	   should	   not	   be	   used	  
in	   production.	  We	   are	   considering	   creating	   a	  more	  
secure	   implementation	   that	   people	   can	   deploy	  
straightaway.	  
5.4.3 SIMPLESAMLPHP	  MODULE	  
As	  outlined	   in	  section	  5.1,	  we	  plan	   to	  use	   tiqr	  
in	   an	   identity	   federation.	   To	   show	   this	   concept	   in	  
action,	  we	  have	  developed	  a	  plug-­‐in	  module	  for	  the	  
popular	  SimpleSAMLphp	  [34]	   identity	  management	  
suite.	  
Our	  demo	  portal	  (https://tiqr.org/demo/)	  us-­‐
es	  this	  implementation.	  
It	   is	   currently	   based	   on	   our	   reference	   imple-­‐
mentation	  so	  it	  is	  not	  sufficiently	  secure	  yet	  for	  pro-­‐
duction	   use.	   We	   are	   collaborating	   with	   the	   Sim-­‐
pleSAMLphp	   team	   to	   create	   a	   production-­‐ready	  




We	   rely	   solely	   on	   open	   standards	   and	   open	  
specifications	   as	   a	   basis	   for	   the	   tiqr	   protocol.	   The	  
following	  standards	  are	  used:	  
 OCRA	  [19]	  –	  this	  is	  the	  suite	  of	  one-­‐time	  pass-­‐
word	   algorithms	   used	   for	   tiqr	   chal-­‐
lenge/response	  
 JSON	  [35]	  –	  this	   is	  the	  object	  notation	  used	  to	  
exchange	  data	  in	  the	  tiqr	  protocol	  
 HTTP	   over	   TLS	   –	   used	   to	   transport	   infor-­‐
mation	  exchanges	  securely	  
 QR	  codes	  [9]	  
5.5.2 ENROLMENT	  
Enrolment	   starts	   with	   a	   QR	   code	   that	   is	   dis-­‐
played	   to	   the	   user.	   This	   QR	   code	   contains	   a	   URL	  
with	  the	  following	  schema:	  
tiqrenroll://<url> 
Where	  <url>	  must	  be	  a	  valid	  HTTPS	  URL	   that	  
points	  to	  a	   location	  where	  the	  details	  for	  the	  enrol-­‐
ment	  request	  can	  be	  retrieved,	  for	  example:	  
tiqrenroll://https://demo.tiqr.org/enroll 
/details?session=082176122169132630 
The	  tiqr	  App	  will	  contact	  this	  URL	  to	  retrieve	  a	  
JSON	  object	  with	  enrolment	  details.	  This	  object	  has	  
the	  following	  syntax:	  
{  
 “service”: {  
      “identifier”: <id>,  
      “displayName”: <name>,  
  “logoUrl”: <logo-url>, 
  “infoUrl”: <info-url>, 
      “authenticationUrl”: <auth-url>, 
  “ocraSuite”: <OCRA-suite>, 
  “enrollmentUrl”: <enroll-url>, 
 },  
   “identity”: {  
      “identifier”: <uid>,  
     “displayName”: <fullName>  
   }  
} 
The	  service	  section	  of	   the	  object	   identifies	   the	  
service	   to	  which	   the	   user	   is	   enrolling.	   The	   identity	  
section	   provides	   details	   about	   the	   identity	   that	   is	  
being	   enrolled.	   The	   fields	   in	   both	   sections	   of	   this	  
object	  have	  the	  following	  semantics:	  
 Service	  section	  
 identifier	   –	   should	   contain	   a	   reversed	   do-­‐
main	  name	  (e.g.	  org.tiqr.demo)	  
 displayName	  –	  should	  contain	   the	  name	  of	  
the	  service	  
 logoUrl	  –	   should	   contain	   a	   valid	   URL	   to	   a	  
service	   logo;	  we	   recommend	  a	  PNG24	   im-­‐
age	  
 infoUrl	  –	  a	  URL	   linking	   to	  a	  webpage	  with	  
more	   information	   about	   the	   identity	   pro-­‐
vider;	  this	  link	  is	  displayed	  on	  the	  “detailed	  
information	  page”	  for	  the	  identity	  
 authenticationUrl	  –	  should	  contain	  the	  URL	  
for	  the	  authentication	  handler	  for	  this	  ser-­‐
vice	  
 ocraSuite	  –	   the	   OCRA	   suite	   the	   server	   re-­‐
quires;	   the	  App	  uses	  this	  to	  determine	  the	  
appropriate	   OCRA	   parameters	   (see	   [19],	  
section	  6)*	  
 enrollmentUrl	  –	  should	  contain	  the	  URL	  for	  
the	  one-­‐time	  enrolment	  handler	  
 Identity	  section	  
 identifier	   –	   should	   contain	   a	   unique	   user	  
identifier	  used	  to	  identify	  the	  account	  
 displayName	   –	   should	   contain	   the	   full	  
name	  of	  the	  user	  
*An	   example	   OCRA	   suite	   as	   specified	   by	   the	  
server	  could	  for	  instance	  be:	  
OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA1-6:QH10-S 
This	  OCRA	  suite	   specification	  breaks	  down	  as	  
follows:	  
 OCRA-­‐1	   –	   the	  OCRA	  algorithm	  version	  (in	   this	  
case	  version	  1,	  the	  current	  version)	  
 HOTP-­‐SHA1-­‐6	  –	   the	   cryptographic	   function	   to	  
use	  (in	  this	  case	  HMAC	  OTP	  [2],	  with	  SHA-­‐1	  as	  
hash	  algorithm	  using	  dynamic	   truncation	   to	  a	  
6-­‐digit	   value);	   the	   tiqr	   App	   supports	   all	   algo-­‐
rithms	  specified	  in	  the	  OCRA	  standard	  
 QH10-­‐S	   –	   the	   input	   for	   the	   challenge	   (in	   this	  
case	  a	  10-­‐digit	  hexadecimal	  value	  represented	  
as	  a	  string)	  and	  the	  size	  of	  the	  session	  data	  (in	  
this	  case	  the	  default	  value	  of	  64	  bytes)	  
For	  more	  examples	  see	  [19].	  
When	   the	   user	   confirms	   enrolment,	   a	   new	  
HTTPS	  connection	   is	  made	  to	  the	  enrolment	  server	  
URL	   specified	   in	   the	   JSON	   object	   enrollmentUrl	  
property.	   A	   POST	   request	   is	   sent	   across	   this	   link.	  
This	  POST	  contains	  the	  following	  parameters:	  
 secret	  –	   this	   is	   the	  shared	  secret;	   the	  secret	   is	  
generated	   by	   the	   App	   on	   the	   phone;	   we	   cur-­‐
rently	  use	  256-­‐bit	  AES	  keys	  as	  secrets	  
 notificationType	  –	  optional;	  this	  is	  the	  notifica-­‐
tion	   type	   used	   to	   send	   push	  messages	   to	   the	  
App	  and	  can	  be	  set	   to	  either	  APNS	   (for	  Apple	  
Push	   Notification	   Service)	   or	   C2DM	   (for	   An-­‐
droid	  push	  notifications)	  
 notificationAddress	   –	   optional;	   notification-­‐
protocol	  specific	  address	  to	  which	  push	  notifi-­‐
cations	  can	  be	  sent	  
 language	   –	   contains	   the	   user	   interface	   lan-­‐
guage	   of	   the	   user;	   this	   information	   may	   be	  
used	  to	  display	  appropriate	  error	  messages	  in	  
the	  user’s	  preferred	  language	  
If	   enrolment	   is	   successful,	   the	   server	   will	   re-­‐
turn	   the	   string	  OK	   (with	   no	  white	   space	   before	   or	  
after	   the	  string).	  When	  an	  error	  occurs,	   the	  normal	  
HTTP	  error	  procedure	   is	   followed	  to	  return	   the	  er-­‐
ror	  to	  the	  App.	  
5.5.3 AUTHENTICATION	  
Authentication	  starts	  by	  displaying	  a	  QR	  code	  
to	   the	   user.	   This	   QR	   code	   contains	   a	   URL	   encoded	  




 <challenge>[?<return Url>] 
The	   fields	   in	   this	   URL	   have	   the	   following	   se-­‐
mantics:	  
 identityIdentifier	  –	  optional	  field	  specifying	  the	  
user	  identity	  to	  use	  for	  authentication;	  may	  be	  
used	  in	  a	  so-­‐called	  step-­‐up	  authentication	  sce-­‐
nario	  where	  the	  user	  has	  already	  logged	  in	  us-­‐
ing	  another	  means	  of	  authentication	  
 serviceIdentifier	   –	   the	   service	   identifier	   as	  
specified	   during	   enrolment	   (the	   service	   do-­‐
main	   name	   in	   reverse	   domain	   notation,	   e.g.	  
org.tiqr.demo)	  
 sessionKey	  –	  session	  key	  for	  this	  authentication	  
request;	   links	   the	   response	   to	   the	   active	   user	  
session	  when	  submitted	  
 challenge	   –	   the	   authentication	   challenge;	   the	  
size	   of	   the	   challenge	   depends	   on	   the	   OCRA	  
suite	  as	  specified	  during	  enrolment	  
 returnUrl	  –	  optional	  field	  specifying	  the	  URL	  to	  
return	  the	  user	   to	  after	  successful	  authentica-­‐
tion;	  this	  URL	  is	  only	  used	  if	  the	  session	  origi-­‐
nated	   from	   the	  mobile	  browser	  on	   the	  device	  
containing	  the	  tiqr	  App	  
The	  tiqr	  App	  will	  compute	  the	  response	  to	  the	  
challenge	   using	   the	   algorithm	   that	   was	   specified	  
during	   enrolment.	   It	   will	   submit	   the	   response	   by	  
setting	  up	  a	  HTTPS	  connection	  to	  the	  authentication	  
endpoint	   specified	   during	   enrolment.	   The	   submis-­‐
sion	  is	  done	  using	  a	  POST	  with	  the	  following	  param-­‐
eters:	  
 sessionKey	  –	  the	  session	  key	  received	  in	  the	  QR	  
code	  identifying	  the	  user	  session	  that	  requires	  
authentication	  
 userId	  –	  the	  user	  identifier	  of	  the	  user	  attempt-­‐
ing	  to	  log	  in	  
 response	  –	  the	  response	  computed	  to	  the	  chal-­‐
lenge	  specified	  in	  the	  QR	  code	  
 language	  –	   the	  user’s	  preferred	   language;	   this	  
information	   is	  used	  to	  display	  error	  messages	  
in	  an	  appropriate	  language	  
If	   authentication	  was	   successful,	   the	  POST	  re-­‐
quest	   returns	   the	   string	   OK	   (with	   no	   white	   space	  
preceding	  or	  following	  the	  string).	   If	  authentication	  
fails,	   the	  server	  will	   return	  one	  of	   the	   following	  er-­‐
ror	  messages:	  
 INVALID_RESPONSE[:attemptsLeft]	   –	   the	   re-­‐
sponse	  provided	   to	   the	  challenge	  was	   invalid;	  
this	   is	   interpreted	  by	  both	   the	  App	  as	  well	   as	  
the	   server	   as	   an	   incorrect	   PIN	   entry.	   The	   op-­‐
tional	   integer	  value	  attemptsLeft	   indicates	   the	  
number	   of	   tries	   left	   to	   return	   a	   correct	   re-­‐
sponse	  (and	  enter	  the	  correct	  PIN)	  
 INVALID_USERID	  –	   the	   server	   does	   not	   know	  
the	  specified	  user	  
 INVALID_CHALLENGE	   –	   there	   is	   no	   known	  
challenge	   for	   the	   current	   session;	   this	   usually	  
indicates	   that	   the	   challenge	  has	  become	   inva-­‐
lid	  because	  of	  a	  timeout	  
 ACCOUNT_BLOCKED[:seconds]	   –	   indicates	   that	  
the	   response	   provided	   to	   the	   challenge	   was	  
invalid	  and	  that	  the	  associated	  user	  account	  is	  
now	  blocked	  on	  the	  server;	  optionally,	   the	  ac-­‐
count	  may	  be	  temporarily	  blocked	  for	  a	  speci-­‐
fied	   number	   of	   seconds	   (this	   feature	   will	   be	  
implemented	  as	  of	  version	  1.2	  of	  the	  tiqr	  App)	  
 INVALID_REQUEST	   –	   the	   POST	   request	   con-­‐
tained	   incorrect	   parameter	   data	   and	   was	   not	  
accepted	  by	  the	  server	  
 ERROR	  –	  an	  unspecified	  error	  occurred	  
5.6 INTEGRATION	  WITH	  APPLICATIONS	  
As	  we	  already	  mentioned	   in	  section	  5.4.2	  and	  
5.4.3,	   we	   already	   provide	   several	   options	   for	   inte-­‐
grating	  tiqr	  into	  existing	  applications.	  The	  reference	  
implementations	  we	  provide	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  
integration	   into	  web	   applications,	   but	   tiqr	   can	   also	  
be	  used	  in	  other	  contexts.	  
Shortly	   after	   the	   first	   release	   of	   tiqr	   an	   inde-­‐
pendent	   software	   vendor,	   RCDevs	   from	   France,	   in-­‐
tegrated	   support	   for	   tiqr	   into	   their	   OpenOTP	   Au-­‐
thentication	   Server	   [36].	   Based	   on	   their	   existing	  
integration	  with	  several	  products	  they	  were	  able	  to	  
show	   that	   tiqr	   can	   –	   for	   instance	   –	   be	   used	   as	   an	  
authentication	   method	   to	   log	   users	   in	   to	   a	   secure	  
shell	  (SSH)	  session	  (see	  Figure	  11	  for	  an	  example).	  
	  
Figure	  11	  -­‐	  using	  tiqr	  to	  authenticate	  an	  SSH	  session*	  
*Screenshot	  courtesy	  of	  Charly	  Rohart	  from	  RCDevs	  
Another	  example	  of	  integration	  into	  third	  par-­‐
ty	   frameworks	   is	   the	  open	  request	   to	   integrate	   tiqr	  
support	   into	   Shibboleth	   [37],	   a	   much-­‐used	   frame-­‐
work	  for	  federated	  identity	  management.	  
5.7 SECURITY	  AUDIT	  
We	   hired	   an	   independent	   security	   auditor	   –	  
Eindhoven-­‐based	   Madison	   Gurkha,	   see	  
http://www.madisongurkha.nl/	   –	   to	   assess	   the	   se-­‐
curity	  of	  tiqr.	  The	  goals	  we	  set	  them	  were	  to:	  
 Assess	  the	  architecture	  and	  design	  of	  tiqr	  from	  
a	  security	  perspective	  
 Perform	  a	  code	  audit	  of	  both	  the	  App	  for	  iOS	  as	  
well	  as	  for	  Android	  
 Perform	  a	   code	  audit	   of	   the	   reference	   server-­‐
side	  implementation	  
 Perform	   security	   tests	   on	   the	   live	   solution	  
(both	  server	  as	  well	  as	  client	  side)	  
The	   security	   audit	  was	   performed	   on	   version	  
1.0	  of	  the	  App	  (as	  released	  in	  April	  2011	  for	  iOS	  and	  
May	   2011	   for	   Android)	   and	   was	   finished	   in	   June.	  
The	  outcome	  of	  the	  security	  audit	  was	  positive;	  alt-­‐
hough	   the	   auditors	   identified	   several	   issues	   that	  
needed	  resolving,	  they	  did	  not	  find	  any	  flaws	  in	  the	  
architecture	   of	   the	   solution	   (note:	   the	   audit	   report	  
will	   be	   published	   on	   the	   tiqr	   website,	  
https://tiqr.org/,	  in	  the	  autumn	  of	  2011).	  The	  most	  
important	   remark	   from	   the	   auditors	   was	   that	   –	  
strictly	  speaking	  –	  tiqr	  does	  not	  offer	  full	  two-­‐factor	  
authentication	   since	   the	   smart	   phone	   platform	   is	  
much	  more	   accessible	   to	   evildoers	   than	   say	   a	   pur-­‐
pose-­‐built	  hardware	  OTP	  token.	  We	  agree	  with	  this	  
but	  would	  like	  to	  add	  that	  tiqr	  nevertheless	  is	  a	  vast	  
improvement	   security-­‐wise	   over	  
username/password.	  And	  relying	  on	  a	  smart	  phone	  
also	   has	   distinct	   advantages;	   recent	   research	   has	  
shown	   that	   users	   are	   likely	   to	   notice	   that	   their	  
phone	  is	  missing	  fairly	  quickly	  (see	   [44]).	  We	  think	  
that	   this	   is	   much	   less	   likely	   to	   be	   the	   case	   for	   e.g.	  
OTP	  tokens,	  since	  the	  single-­‐purpose	  nature	  of	  these	  
devices	  means	  they	  are	  used	  much	  less	  frequently.	  	  
We	  have	  taken	  care	  to	  include	  several	  security	  
measures	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   inherent	   untrustworthy	  
nature	   of	   smart	   phone	   platforms	   (see	   5.3.2).	   The	  
auditors	   agree	   that	   these	   measures	   indeed	   signifi-­‐
cantly	  enhance	  the	  security	  and	  they	  also	  agree	  that	  
tiqr	   is	   an	   attractive	   and	  more	   secure	   alternative	   to	  
username/password.	  They	  caution	  though	  that	   it	   is	  
not	  fully	  equivalent	  to	  the	  security	  a	  hardware	  OTP	  
token	   can	   offer.	  We	  would	   like	   to	   note	   that	   this	   is	  
also	   true	   for	   the	   more	   traditional	   OTP	   Apps	   that	  
OTP	  token	  vendors	  have	  started	  offering	  (see	  2.4.2).	  
Another	  remark	  that	  the	  auditors	  made	  is	  that	  
tiqr	   is	  potentially	   vulnerable	   to	  phishing.	  Attackers	  
could	  perform	  a	  man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	  attack	  by	  initiat-­‐
ing	  an	  authentication	  session,	  thus	  retrieving	  the	  QR	  
code	  containing	  the	  challenge	  and	  by	  displaying	  this	  
on	  a	   fake	  site,	   tricking	   the	  user	   in	   to	   logging	   in	  but	  
instead	   giving	   the	   attacker	   access	   to	   their	   account.	  
We	  agree	  that	  this	  is	  a	  risk	  and	  as	  mitigation	  the	  tiqr	  
App	   always	   displays	   the	   fully	   qualified	   domain	  
name	  of	  the	  site	  that	  the	  user	  is	  being	  authenticated	  
to.	  Users	  are	  expected	  to	  validate	  the	  authenticity	  of	  
the	  site	   they	  are	   logging	   into	   in	   the	  same	  way	   they	  
do	   for	   e.g.	   their	   banking	   site,	   i.e.	   by	   checking	   the	  
site’s	  URL	  and	  server	  certificate.	  Note	  that	  this	  prob-­‐
lem	   is	   not	   unique	   to	   tiqr;	   all	   OTP	   solutions	   are	  
equally	  vulnerable	  to	  phishing.	  
The	  issues	  in	  the	  code	  and	  design	  identified	  by	  
the	  auditors	  were	  resolved	  in	  version	  1.1	  of	  the	  App	  
and	   in	   the	   reference	   server-­‐side	   implementation	  
that	  is	  available	  from	  the	  tiqr	  website.	  We	  also	  con-­‐
tributed	   fixes	   for	   the	   vulnerabilities	   in	   the	   OCRA	  
reference	  implementation	  back	  to	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  
RFC.	  
5.8 AVAILABILITY	  
From	   the	   onset	   it	   has	   been	   our	   goal	   to	  make	  
tiqr	  freely	  available	  to	  all	  Internet	  users.	  To	  achieve	  
this	   goal,	  we	  have	   released	  all	   relevant	   software	   in	  
open	  source	  under	  a	  BSD-­‐style	  licence	  and	  we	  have	  
made	  the	  tiqr	  Apps	  available	  for	  free	  in	  both	  the	  App	  
Store	  as	  well	  as	  on	  the	  Android	  Market.	  
All	  source	  code	  and	  documentation	  as	  well	  as	  a	  
demo	   server	   can	   be	   found	   on	   our	   website,	  
https://tiqr.org/	  
5.9 ROADMAP	  AND	  FUTURE	  WORK	  
Now	  that	  a	  production-­‐ready	  version	  is	  availa-­‐
ble	   our	   next	   step	  will	   be	   to	   deploy	   tiqr	  within	   our	  
own	   organisation.	   SURFnet	   currently	   uses	   X.509	  
software	   certificates	   for	   authentication	   to	   certain	  
services.	   We	   plan	   to	   replace	   these	   by	   tiqr.	   All	  
SURFnet	  employees	  have	  either	  an	  iOS-­‐	  or	  Android-­‐
based	  smart	  phone	  making	   it	  an	   ideal	  user	  popula-­‐
tion	  in	  which	  to	  use	  tiqr.	  
When	   we	   have	   gained	   real-­‐world	   experience	  
we	  will	  evaluate	   this	  deployment.	  Then,	  we	  plan	   to	  
gradually	   introduce	   tiqr	   as	   an	  alternative	  means	  of	  
authentication	   (alternative	   to	   username/password	  
and/or	  SMS	  authentication)	  in	  some	  of	  the	  services	  
we	  offer	  to	  our	  constituency.	  
We	   are	   also	   talking	   to	   our	   connected	   institu-­‐
tions	  to	  set	  up	  a	  pilot	  with	  a	   larger	  population.	  Our	  
goal	   is	   to	   provide	   tiqr	   as	   an	   alternative	   means	   of	  
authentication	  on	  an	  identity	  provider	  in	  our	  federa-­‐
tion	  who	  currently	  only	  offer	  username/password.	  
One	  of	  the	  things	  we	  will	  be	  evaluating	  in	  the-­‐
se	  pilot	  deployments	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  paradigm	  
of	   encouraging	   users	   to	   use	   the	   same	   PIN	   for	   all	  
their	   tiqr	   accounts	   works	   and	   whether	   or	   not	   it	  
makes	   sense	   to	   block	   all	   accounts	   if	   one	   account	  
needs	   to	  be	  blocked	  because	  of	   too	  many	   failed	  at-­‐
tempts	  at	  entering	  the	  correct	  PIN.	  
From	  a	  technological	  perspective,	  we	  are	  con-­‐
sidering	  pursuing	  several	  areas	  of	  research:	  
 Turning	   tiqr	   into	   a	   true	   hardware	   token	   by	  
leveraging	  the	  possibilities	  offered	  by	  SD	  cards	  
with	   an	   embedded	   smart	   card	   controller	  
(smartSD	  cards,	  see	  [39])	  
 Incorporating	   attribute	   release	   into	   tiqr	  
(where	   tiqr	   releases	   attributes	   about	   a	   user	  
asserted	   by	   a	   trusted	   third	   party),	   similar	   to	  
the	  InfoCards	  paradigm	  (see	  [38])	  
 Using	  advances	   in	  cryptography	  such	  as	  zero-­‐
knowledge	  proof	  to	  further	  enhance	  the	  priva-­‐
cy	  aspects	  of	  tiqr.	  
 Using	   tiqr	   for	   transaction	   signing	   (as	   is	   e.g.	  
done	  by	  banks	  with	  OTP	  tokens	  to	  approve	  fi-­‐
nancial	  transactions).	  
Some	  of	   these	  we	  will	   probably	  do	   ourselves,	  
others	  we	  hope	  to	  pursue	  together	  with	  the	  academ-­‐
ic	  community	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  cryptography	  and	  digi-­‐
tal	  security.	  
5.10 REFLECTION	  
When	  we	  started	  the	  tiqr	  project	  we	  set	  out	  to	  
create	   a	   two-­‐factor	   authentication	   solution	   that	  
would	   leverage	   the	   benefits	   of	   using	   a	   device	   that	  
(almost)	   everybody	   has:	   a	  mobile	   phone.	  We	  were	  
also	   mindful	   that	   the	   solution	   should	   be	   an	   im-­‐
provement	  over	  username/password	  given	   the	   cri-­‐
teria	  introduced	  in	  section	  4	  and	  if	  possible	  it	  should	  
also	   offer	   advantages	   over	   more	   traditional	   solu-­‐
tions.	  
We	   feel	   that	  with	   tiqr	  we	  have	  achieved	  most	  
of	   these	   goals.	   We	   believe	   tiqr	   to	   be	   very	   user-­‐
friendly	  (much	  more	  so	  than	  some	  other	  two	  factor	  
authentication	   solutions)	   and	   also	   believe	   that	   tiqr	  
is	   an	   improvement	   in	   terms	   of	   security	   over	  
username/password	   and	   on	   a	   par	   in	   that	   respect	  
with	   many	   other	   two-­‐factor	   authentication	   solu-­‐
tions.	   Furthermore,	   we	   believe	   that	   tiqr	   can	   be	   a	  
viable	   replacement	   for	   more	   traditional	   OTP	   solu-­‐
tions,	  especially	   the	  OTP	  Apps	  and	  SMS	  authentica-­‐
tion.	  
We	  feel	  that	  we	  should	  point	  out,	  though,	  that	  
tiqr	   is	   not	   a	   panacea	   that	   solves	   all	   problems	   in	  
(two-­‐factor)	  authentication.	  It	  is,	  for	  instance,	  just	  as	  
vulnerable	  to	  phishing	  as	  traditional	  OTP	  solutions.	  
And	  because	  it	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  purpose-­‐built	  hard-­‐
ware	   to	   store	   the	   secret	  data	   associated	  with	   a	  us-­‐
er’s	  identity	  its	  security	  is	  not	  as	  strong	  as	  tradition-­‐
al	  tokens.	  
Nevertheless,	  we	  feel	  that	  tiqr	  is	  a	  useful	  addi-­‐
tion	   to	   the	   two-­‐factor	   authentication	   landscape.	   Its	  
user-­‐friendliness	  and	  the	  control	  over	  deployment	  it	  
gives	  to	  organisations	  are	  also	  strong	  points.	  
6 CLASSIFICATION	  REVISITED	  
6.1 INTRODUCTION	  
In	  section	  4	  we	   introduced	  a	  classification	   for	  
authentication	   solutions,	   judging	   solutions	   on	  
hardware	   (in)-­‐dependence,	   software	   (in)-­‐
dependence,	   security,	   cost,	   open	   standards	   compli-­‐
ance	  and	  ease-­‐of-­‐use.	  Now	  that	  we	  have	  introduced	  
tiqr,	  we	  will	  revisit	  this	  classification.	  
6.2 CLASSIFICATION	  OF	  TIQR	  
Table	  1	   showed	  a	   classification	  of	   authentica-­‐
tion	  solutions	  according	  to	  the	  criteria	  introduced	  in	  
section	  4.	  In	  Table	  2	  we	  have	  reprinted	  this	  classifi-­‐
cation	   and	   added	   tiqr	   at	   the	   bottom	   of	   the	   table	  










Usern./pwd	   ++	   ++	   -­‐-­‐	   ++	   =	   +/-­‐	  
OTP	  token	   -­‐	   -­‐	   ++	   -­‐-­‐	   -­‐/=	   +	  
C/R	  token	   -­‐	   -­‐	   ++	   -­‐-­‐	   -­‐/=	   +	  
PKI	  token	   -­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐	   ++	   -­‐-­‐	   =	   +	  
Mobile	  PKI	   +	   +	   ++	   ?	   +	   ++	  
SMS	  OTP	   +	   =	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐-­‐	   -­‐	  
OTP	  Apps	   +	   +/=	   +	   +/=	   +/=	   =	  
tiqr	   +/=	   +/=	   +	   +	   ++	   ++	  
Table	  2	  -­‐	  Classification	  including	  tiqr	  
Again,	   one	   could	   argue	   that	   any	   classification	  
is	   subjective,	   especially	   since	   we	   are	   judging	   our	  
own	  solution.	  Therefore,	  we	  have	  tried	  to	  justify	  the	  
classification	  we	  have	  assigned	  to	  tiqr	  below:	  
 Hardware	   (in-­‐)dependence	   –	   tiqr	   requires	   ad-­‐
vanced	   features	   only	   available	   on	   smart	  
phones;	   it	   is	   therefore	   not	   as	   hardware	   inde-­‐
pendent	  as	  some	  of	  the	  other	  solutions	  that	  re-­‐
ly	  on	  mobile	  phones	  
 Software	   (in-­‐)dependence	   –	   tiqr	   is	   currently	  
only	  available	  for	  two	  smart	  phone	  platforms	  
 Security	  –	  although	  not	  as	  secure	  as	  a	  dedicat-­‐
ed	   token,	   tiqr	   is	   much	   more	   secure	   than	  
username/password	   and	   on	   a	   par	  with	   other	  
OTP	  Apps	  
 Cost	   –	   tiqr	   is	   open	   source	   and	   available	   for	  
free;	  the	  only	  inhibiting	  factor	  may	  be	  the	  cost	  
of	  the	  device	  required	  to	  run	  tiqr	  
 Open	   standards	   –	   tiqr	   was	   built	   from	   the	  
ground	  up	   to	   include	  open	   standards	   and	   the	  
tiqr	  protocol	  itself	  has	  also	  been	  published	  
 Ease-­‐of-­‐use	   –	   tiqr	   was	   designed	   to	   be	   user	  
friendly	   from	   the	   ground	   up	   by	   skilled	   inter-­‐
face	  designers	  
7 CONCLUSIONS	   AND	   RECOMMEN-­‐
DATIONS	  
7.1 THE	  NEED	  FOR	  TWO-­‐FACTOR	  AUTHEN-­‐
TICATION	  
Our	   lives	   are	   increasingly	   being	   lived	   in	   the	  
digital	  world.	  Social	  networks	  have	  become	  the	  sta-­‐
ple	   of	   a	   new	   generation	   and	   many	   professionals	  
cannot	   live	   without	   e-­‐mail,	   VoIP,	   and	   services	   like	  
LinkedIn.	   Governments	   and	   the	   public	   sector	   are	  
also	  increasingly	  making	  vast	  amounts	  of	  often	  per-­‐
sonal	  data	  (like	  medical	  records)	  available	  online.	  
This	  means	  that	  the	  value	  of	  the	  digital	  identi-­‐
ties	   we	   use	   to	   access	   these	   services	   are	   becoming	  
ever	  more	   valuable.	   It	   is	   no	   longer	   just	   your	   credit	  
card	   that	   is	  at	   risk	  of	  being	  stolen,	  whole	   identities	  
get	  hijacked.	  
We	  feel	  that	  it	  is	  inevitable	  that	  two-­‐factor	  au-­‐
thentication	  becomes	  more	  widespread	  and	  actively	  
try	   to	   stimulate	   its	   adoption,	   both	  within	   our	   own	  
community	  as	  well	  as	  on	  a	  wider	  scale.	  
7.2 OPEN	  STANDARDS	  AND	  OPEN	  SOURCE	  
The	  best	  way	   forward	   to	  bring	   two-­‐factor	  au-­‐
thentication	   to	   a	  wider	   audience	   is	   the	   adoption	  of	  
open	  standards	  by	  vendors.	  This	  applies	  foremost	  to	  
vendors	  of	  hardware	  OTP	  and	  PKI	  tokens.	   It	   is	  also	  
of	   paramount	   importance	   that	   integration	   of	   two-­‐
factor	   authentication	   in	   online	   services	   becomes	  
easier.	   One	   way	   of	   achieving	   this	   is	   by	   releasing	  
open	   source	   solutions	  with	   flexible	   licenses.	   These	  
can	   serve	   as	   useful	   examples	   and	   facilitate	   rapid	  
integration.	  
7.3 TIQR	  
We	   have	   strived	   to	   practice	   what	   we	   preach	  
when	  creating	  tiqr.	  We	  have	  focused	  on	  creating	  an	  
open	  standards-­‐based,	  open	  source	  and	  easy-­‐to-­‐use	  
solution	  that	   is	   freely	  available.	  We	  believe	  that	  we	  
have	  succeeded	  in	  the	  goals	  we	  set	  ourselves	  in	  that	  
respect	  and	  we	  hope	  that	  tiqr	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  starting	  
point	  for	  many	  organisations	  who	  want	  to	  integrate	  
two-­‐factor	  authentication	  into	  their	  online	  services.	  
What	   is	   also	   noteworthy	   to	   mention	   is	   that	  
parts	  of	   the	   tiqr	  project	  have	  now	  been	  spun	  off	  as	  
separate	  open	  source	  projects	  because	  of	  their	  gen-­‐
eral	  applicability.	  These	  include	  TokenExchange	  (an	  
abstraction	  for	  push	  notifications	  supporting	  sever-­‐
al	   device	   platforms),	   see	   [42],	   and	   a	   set	   of	   OCRA	  
reference	  implementations	   in	  several	  programming	  
languages,	  see	  [43].	  
7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS	  
We	   have	   already	   outlined	   recommendations	  
for	  future	  work	  on	  tiqr	  in	  section	  5.9.	  In	  addition	  to	  
that,	  we	  would	   recommend	  any	   readers	  of	   this	  pa-­‐
per	  to	  invest	  some	  time	  into	  considering	  what	  two-­‐
factor	  authentication	  could	  add	  in	  terms	  of	  security	  
both	  within	   their	   own	   organisations	   as	  well	   as	   for	  
users	  of	  their	  online	  services.	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